INCORPORATING SAFETY-FIRST CONSTRAINTS IN LINEAR PROGRAMMING PRODUCTION MODELS by Atwood, Joseph A. et al.
Incorporating Safety-First
Constraints in Linear Programming
Production Models
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A recent survey indicated that many producers  view risk in a safety-first context.
Traditional methods used to impose  safety-first  constraints in optimization models
have  often been difficult  to implement. This is particularly  true when endogenous
decisions  affect the distribution  of the chance-constrained  random variable. This
paper  presents a method whereby probabilistic constraints  can be easily imposed upon
finitely discrete  random  variables. The procedure uses  a linear version of the lower
partial moment  stochastic inequality.  The resulting solutions  are somewhat
conservative but are  less so than the results  using the previously published  mean
income-absolute  deviation stochastic inequality.
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Identifying  and  modeling  the  processes  that
decision makers use to address and control risk
continue  to stimulate  the research  efforts  of
agricultural  economists.  Several  models  have
been  commonly  employed  including  the  ex-
pected utility model and the safety-first models.
The expected utility model is widely accepted
as  a risk  model  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  its
axiomatic  choice  foundations.  Recently  sev-
eral researchers  have  noted consistent  viola-
tions of one  or  more  of the  choice  axioms,
which has led to reexamination  of alternative
or modified models  of risky  decision making
(Machina).
The safety-first model is an alternative mod-
el in which  the  decision  maker is  concerned
with (or constrained by) the probability of fail-
ing to  achieve  his  income  goals.  The  safety-
first model,  in general,  is not consistent with
the expected utility model (Pyle and Turnov-
sky).  However,  as reported  by Patrick  et al.,
the results of a recent producer survey indicate
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that safety-first-type  concerns  may be impor-
tant in firm decisions.
To  identify  the  risk  perceptions  and  re-
sponses of producers,  Patrick et al. coordinat-
ed  a  survey of 149  agricultural  producers  in
twelve  states.  Patrick et al.  report that many
producers "indicated what could be interpret-
ed as substantial 'safety-first' considerations in
their decision  making"  (pp.  237-238).  Such
results indicate that the safety-first model may
be worth further investigation.
Safety-first-type  concepts  have  long  been
discussed as a method of decision making un-
der uncertainty (see Shackle,  Roy, Telser, Ka-
taoka).  Various  safety-first  criteria have been
discussed.  Roy  proposed that  the probability
of income falling below critical values or goal
be minimized.  Telser proposed  that expected
income  be  maximized  subject  to  satisfying
probabilistic  constraints  upon  the  likelihood
of low income levels. Kataoka discussed find-
ing the maximum income level g for which the
probability of income falling below g is below
a prespecified  level.  Both Telser's and Katao-
ka's  criterion  involve  enforcing  probabilistic
constraints  of the form,
Pr(Z  < g)  1/IL*,
where Pr (.) is the probability  of event (.), Z
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is a random  variable (income), g is a goal  as-
sociated with Z, and  1/L* is an upper limit on
Pr(Z <  g). Enforcing  such probabilistic  con-
straints in an optimization  model can be dif-
ficult if (a) the income distribution is nonnor-
mal  or (b)  the realized  values of the income
distribution are affected by endogenous model
decisions. These and other difficulties  are dis-
cussed by Sengupta.
This paper presents a method whereby prob-
abilistic constraints can be  enforced easily  in
a slightly modified Target MOTAD model. The
method uses the linear lower partial moment
(LPM) stochastic inequality recently presented
by Atwood.  The procedure  is flexible  in that
it requires  only  that the random  variable  be
finitely discrete (or approximated as such). The
random variable can be a linear combination
and/or  transformation  of finitely  discrete
multivariate random  variables.
This  paper  will  briefly  review  alternative
methods  of imposing  probabilistic  or safety-
first-type  constraints  including  the  use of the
lower  partial  moment  (LPM)  stochastic  in-
equality. Modified Target MOTAD models are
then presented  which implement Telser's and
Kataoka's  criterion.  An  example  using  data
from  Hazell's  MOTAD  article  is  then  pre-
sented and contrasted to the results of the lin-
ear  stochastic  inequality  model  discussed  by
Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker. A discussion
of model  weaknesses  and possible  extensions
concludes  the paper.
Imposing Probabilistic Constraints
Methods to enforce safety-first or probabilistic
constraints  vary  depending  upon  model  as-
sumptions.  In  chance-constrained  program-
ming,  a common approach  is  to convert  the
probabilistic  constraint  into  a  deterministi-
cally equivalent constraint (Chares and Coo-
per). However, in many applications,  the dis-
tribution  of the  random  variable  is  endoge-
nously determined  by the choice of activities,
making  the derivation  of a deterministically
equivalent  constraint  difficult  or  impossible.
A second approach requires the assumption of
multivariate normality and the ability to gen-
erate a mean-variance (E-V)-efficient set of so-
lutions. Pyle and Turnovsky use this assump-
tion and  method to contrast  expected utility
maximization  and safety-first  solutions.
A third approach to imposing  probabilistic
constraints involves  the use  of stochastic  in-
equalities to generate sharp upper bounds upon
probabilities. The use of such inequalities  re-
quires the knowledge of certain population pa-
rameters  such  as  the mean and  variance and
usually  generates  conservative  probability
bounds. Several authors have discussed the use
of stochastic  inequalities.  Examples  include
papers by Roy; Telser;  Kennedy and Francis-
co; Anderson,  Dillon, and  Hardaker;  Gabriel
and  Baker;  Sengupta;  and  Berck  and  Hihn.
These studies (with the exception of Berck and
Hihn) use the well-known Chebychev inequal-
ity to  impose  probabilistic  constraints  upon
random variables.  Berck and Hihn use a non-
linear version of the lower partial moment in-
equality to be discussed below.
Commonly  known  stochastic  inequalities,
such as Chebychev's mean-standard-error  in-
equality,  usually generate  conservative  prob-
ability bounds.  Being  nonlinear,  directly im-
plementing  probabilistic  constraints  with
Chebychev's  inequality  can  be  difficult  (see
Sengupta). 1Alternative linear Chebychev-type
inequalities  are available  which  generate  less
conservative  probability bounds than the gen-
eral Chebychev  inequality. One such inequal-
ity using lower partial  moments was recently
presented by Atwood using continuous distri-
butions.
The  stochastic  inequality presented  by At-
wood uses a parameter which has been termed
a lower partial moment (see Nantell, Price, and
Price). For discrete populations the lower par-
tial moment LPM  can be denoted as R(a, t),
where
(1) R(a, t) =  H  (t - z,)a.
zi<t
In (1), R(a, t) is the lower partial moment, t is
a reference  level  below  which  deviations  are
measured,  z, is the value  of Z should  state  i
occur, a > 0 is the power to which deviations
below t are raised, andf is the probability that
state i occurs.  The above LPM can be used to
generate  the  following  stochastic  inequality
(Atwood):
(2)  Pr(Z  < t - pQ(a, t))  < (/p)a,
1 Linear  versions  of Chebychev's  inequality  exist.  Anderson,
Dillon, and  Hardaker  use  a mean-absolute  deviation version  to
impose  probabilistic  constraints  upon  solutions.  Although  the
E-A inequality can be used in a linear model, the resulting solutions
tend to be quite conservative.
30  July 1988Safety-First Constraints  31
where  Q(a,  t)  =  [R(a,  t)] la >  0  and p  is  a
constant greater than zero. Ifp is defined as p
- (t  - g)/Q(a, t) with t  > g and  Q(a, t) > 0,
then (2) can be written as
(3)  Pr(Z < g) = Pr(Z <  t - pQ(a, t))
[Q(a, t)/(t - g)]a.
If either  Q(a,  t)  = 0  or  t = g,  the  stochastic
inequality is inapplicable  as p in (2) or Q(a, t)/
(t - g) in  (3)  is undefined.
The reader will note that any power of a >
0 (in particular, a = 1)  can be used in the above
inequality.  For the  remainder  of this  paper,
the  linear lower partial  moment  (a = 1) will
be used and denoted as Q(t) = Q(1, t)  = R(1,
t). This  allows (3) to be rewritten as
(4)  Pr(Z  <  g) = Pr(Z  <  t - pQ(t)) ￿  Q(t)/(t - g)
if Q(t) > 0 and t > g. Using (4), Atwood stated
that  enforcing  the  following  constraint  in an
optimization  model  is sufficient  to guarantee
Pr(Z  < g)  < 1/L* with discrete  populations.
The sufficiency  constraint is
(5) t-  L*Q(t)  >  g.
A demonstration that (5)  is only sufficient for
Pr(Z < g)  ￿  1/L* and not Pr(Z < g)  <  1/L*
is presented in appendix  1.
The LPM and the Linear Model
The above sufficiency constraint (5) can be eas-
ily enforced with a set of linear constraints by
slightly  modifying  the  linear  LPM  model
known  as  Target  MOTAD  (see  Held, Watts,
and  Helmers;  Tauer;  and  Watts,  Held,  and
Helmers).  To demonstrate  this,  note that the
Target MOTAD model can be written as
(6)  maximize  E(Z) = Ey'x




Yx  - It  + Id  > 0,
r'd <  k,
t = g,
x, d,  > 0,
where E(Z) is expected aggregate  income;  Ey'
is a transposed vector of per-unit expected in-
come levels; x is a vector of activity levels; A
is a matrix of technical coefficients; b is a vector
of right-hand-side  coefficients;  Y  =  [y0]  is  a
matrix of possible per-unit income levels with
ij the  income of activity j  should outcome  i
occur. Yx is thus a vector of possible aggregate
income  states;2 1 is  a vector  of ones;  t  is  a
reference  level  for  aggregate  income;  I  is an
identity matrix;  d is a vector with the ith ele-
ment equal to the deviation below t if  aggregate
income in state i falls below t and zero if in-
come  exceeds  t;  r' is  a  transposed  vector  of
probability  levels with r'd equal  to Q(t); k is
an upper limit on Q(t) = r'd; and g is the ag-
gregate  income  goal  of concern.  The  Target
MOTAD  model determines  a feasible choice
vector x, which maximizes expected  aggregate
income  while  requiring  that  probability-
weighted deviations below t = g not exceed k.
Tauer demonstrated  that solutions  to  system
(6), if unique, are second-degree stochastically
efficient.  The inequalities  in (6) can be easily
modified  to  compute  Q(l,  t)  for  any  t-level
and to impose  sufficiency constraint (5) on the
system.  The following  system maximizes  ex-
pected aggregate  income subject to Pr(Z < g)
<  1/L*. The system is





subject to:  Ax < b,
Yx  - it  + Id >  0,
r'd - Q(t) = 0,
t  - L*Q(t) > g,
x, d, > 0.
System (7) differs from (6)  in several ways. An
activity (column) has been included in (7) to
compute and transfer  Q(t) = r'd from (7c) and
subtract L*Q(t) from  (7d). The deviation  ref-
erence  level t is no longer required to equal g
but is allowed to be  endogenously  set at  any
level  which  satisfies  (7d)  [or  (5)].  Simulta-
neously,  (7b)  and  (7c)  compute  the  corre-
sponding  Q(t) level. If (7d) is constraining, the
level of t selected will be the least constraining
level  possible while  satisfying (7d).  As stated
earlier, this corresponds to the endogenous se-
lection  of the least constraining  linear  lower
partial  moment from  the  set of lower  partial
moments for which t  - L*Q(t)  - g.
System  (7)  selects  an activity mix x which
maximizes E(Z) while simultaneously enforc-
ing probabilistic constraints upon the possible
outcomes  with  the  least  constraining  linear
2 The vector  Yx can  be  viewed  as a  univariate vector  z  upon
which deviations  are computed and probabilistic constraints  im-
posed. The univariate  vector z may not be aggregate  income. The
methods presented can thus be used  to impose probabilistic con-
straints upon non-income  random variables.
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LPM  stochastic  inequality.  By redefining  the
vector  Yx = z, (see footnote  2), the above sys-
tem can be used to constrain  any finitely dis-
crete univariate random variable. The random
variables  so constrained can be a linear trans-
formation and/or combination of one or more
finitely discrete random variables. In the above
case  (Telser's  criterion),  the random  variable
Z (aggregate  income)  is a linear combination
ofk multivariate income random variables. As
will be noted later, the random variables need
not be income.
The above system can easily be modified to
directly solve  Kataoka's  safety-first  criterion.
Since t - L*Q(t)  > gis equivalent to requiring
t  - L*Q(t) - g >  O,  a  system which  imple-
ments Kataoka's  criterion can be written as





subject to:  Ax  - b,
Yx  - It  + Id  >  0,
r'd - Q(t) = 0,
t - L*Q(t) - g >  0,











Data  from  Hazell's  original  MOTAD  article
will  now  be used  to demonstrate  the imple-
mentation of Telser's and Kataoka's  criteria.3
Table  1  presents the tableau which implements
Telser's  criterion.  (The  footnotes indicate
changes required for Kataoka's criterion.) Tle
system  in  table  1 is  identical  to  system  (7)
except that an accounting row and transfer col-
umn have been added to compute and transfer
expected  aggregate  income into  the objective
function.4 In table 1, the selection of carrot (xl),
celery (x2), cucumber (x3), and pepper (x4) ac-
tivity levels are constrained by the land, labor,
and rotational constraints of Hazell's example.
The  Yij  entries  under  the  Xj  activities  corre-
spond to gross income levels in state i for crop
j and are obtained  from Hazell's table  1.
3  Hazell's data has now been used  in several risk models.  The
reader may wonder which is "best" for risky decision  models. The
answer will likely depend upon the objectives of the study. Should
the researcher  feel that the E-V model is appropriate,  the original
MOTAD model may be appropriate.  The Target  MOTAD model
can be used to generate stochastically efficient solutions. The model
of this paper enforces safety-first decisions. It is likely that no single
model can be used exclusively in modeling risky decision making.
4 The income accounting  row and transfer column simplify the
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Table  2.  Lower Partial Moment Safety-First Solutions-Telser's  Criterion
Proba-
bility  Actual Probabilities  Endo-
Income  Con-  Mean  Activity  Levels  genously
Goal  straint  Income  Pr  Pr  Selected
g  1/L*  E  ($)  x,  x2 X3  x4 (Z < g)  (Z  < g)  t  Q(t)
50,000  0  74,054  100  39  0  61  0  .167  50,000  0
.25  77,996a  0  27  100  73  .1667  .1667  NAb  NA
.30  77,996a  0  27  100  73  .1667  .1667  NA  NA
.35  77,996
a 0  27  100  73  .1667  .1667  NA  NA
55,000  0  71,003  111  41  0  48  0  .333  55,000  0
.25  73,526  33  28  81  57  .1667  .1667  73,497  4,624
.30  77,996a  0  27  100  73  .1667  .1667  NA  NA
.35  77,996a  0  27  100  73  .1667  .1667  NA  NA
60,000  0  65,818  89  31  50  29  0  .5  60,000  0
.25  66,002  82  30  58  30  .1667  .1667  61,546  386
.30  66,895  76  30  61  33  .1667  .1667  62,963  889
.35  77,996
a 0  27  100  73  .1667  .1667  NA  NA
a  Sufficiency  constraint nonbinding.
b Non-constraining  with multiple  t and Q(t) feasible.
Tables  2,  3, and 4 present solutions  for the
example  problem.  Table  2 presents  the solu-
tions with glevels (income goals) set at $50,000,
$55,000,  and $60,000,  and probability  limits
of 0, .25,  .3, and .35. The reader will note that
for all solutions presented, the probability con-
straint Pr(Z < g) is satisfied. As stated above,
however,  the  use  of the  LPM  stochastic  in-
equality  often  results  in  conservative  solu-
tions.  As an example,  when g = $60,000 and
1/L*  =  .25,  the  optimal  activity  mix has an
expected  income  of  $66,002  with  Pr(Z  <
60,000) = .1667. The non-risk-constrained  ex-
pected  profit-maximizing solution  has an  ex-
pected return of  $77,996 but also only has Pr(Z
< 60,000) = .1667.5 Should the researcher not
be willing  to tolerate  such  conservative  solu-
tions,  he  may  be  required  to  attempt  other
chance-constrained  methods  as  discussed
above.
The  solutions presented  in table  2 demon-
strate that (5) or (7d) does not guarantee Pr(Z
< g)  < 1/L* when Q(t = g) = 0. All solutions
for which  l/q* = 0 generated  Q(t) = 0 with  t
= g.  With g = 50,000,  (7d) is satisfied with  t
=  50,000,  and  Q(t)  =  0.  Although  Pr(Z  <
50,000) = 0, Pr(Z < 50,000) = .167  > 0. Sim-
ilarly Pr(Z  <  g =  55,000)  and  Pr(Z  <  g =
60,000) are .333  and .5 which exceed  1/L* =
5  Although  such  solutions  remain  conservative,  they  are  gen-
erally much less  so than those generated with the  E-A stochastic
inequality method as will be discussed shortly.
0.  These  results  are  consistent  with the  dis-
cussion of inequality (5) presented in appendix
1. Also consistent with these discussions is the
fact that ifPr(Z < g) >  0, (7d) is satisfied only
with  Q(t) > 0 and t > g.
Table 3 presents solutions  of Kataoka's  cri-
terion obtained with  system (7) and the E-A
stochastic  inequality  approach.  (Appendix  2
presents the required modifications of the An-
derson, Dillon,  and Hardaker E-A  safety-first
method.)  The  goal  obtained  with  the  LPM
method equals $60,456 for all probability levels
examined.  The increased  conservativeness  of
the solutions obtained with the E-A stochastic
inequality is apparent  from table  3. If 1/L* =
0,  the  only feasible  solution  is the origin for
which Pr(Z  <  0)  =  1. This results  from  the
fact that  with  MOTAD  models  the  risk ref-
erence  point  is  mean  income.  With  Hazell's
example,  no solutions  existed with E(Z) > 0
and A  = 0.  When  l/L* =  .25,  .30,  or .35,  the
E-A method generated the solution (x,, x2 ,  x 3 ,
x4) =  (72, 27,  84,  17). For this solution E(Z)
=  $62,769, which is lower than that obtained
with the LPM inequality.  In  all cases, the re-
ported goal g was also lower than that obtained
with the linear LPM inequality.
Table  4  contrasts  the  results  of using  the
LPM versus the E-A inequalities when imple-
menting Telser's criterion.  In all cases, the re-
sults obtained with the LPM method generate
higher  expected  incomes  than  with  the  E-A
method.  As an  example,  when g =  $52,000,
Atwood et al.Western Journal  ofAgricultural Economics
Table 3.  Lower Partial Moment  and E-A Safety-First Solutions-Kataoka's  Criterion
Actual Probabilities
Probability  Maximum  Mean  Activity Levels
Constraint  Goal  Income  Pr  Pr
1/L*  g  Ez  xI X 2 X 3 X 4 (Z < g)  (Z < g)
LPM method
0  60,456  65,316  86  31  56  27  0  2/3
.25  60,456  65,316  86  31  56  27  0  2/3
.30  60,456  65,316  86  31  56  27  0  2/3
.35  60,456  65,316  86  31  56  27  0  2/3
E-A method
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1
.25  51,755  62,769  72  27  84  17  0  0
.30  53,590  62,769  72  27  84  17  0  0
.35  54,902  62,769  72  27  84  17  0  0
the  LPM  method  generates  E(Z) =  $73,201
and $77,896  when  1/L* =  0 and .25,  respec-
tively.  At these probability levels, no feasible
solutions are  available  with g =  $52,000  for
the  E-A  method.  When  1/L* is  increased  to
.3,  the  mean income  levels  are  $77,996  and
$64,328  for the LPM  and  E-A  methods,  re-
spectively. In all solutions reported in table 4,
the excess conservatism of the E-A Chebychev
inequality results  in relatively  large  sacrifices
of  expected income when contrasted to the cor-
responding LPM solution.
Summary and Conclusions
Results recently  reported by Patrick et al.  in-
dicate that the safety-first model may be useful
in explaining  producer  behavior.  Traditional
methods to impose safety-first or probabilistic
constraints in an optimization  model may be
difficult  to  implement  when  producer  deci-
sions influence  outcome distributions.
This  paper has  demonstrated  that a linear
version of  the lower partial moment inequality
presented  by Atwood  can be used to enforce
probabilistic or safety-first constraints in linear
models.6 The methods  presented require that
the constrained  distributions  be  finitely  dis-
crete. The procedures  are flexible and require
only that the vector of potential events can be
computed  with  linear operations.  If a vector
of potential events can be so computed,  then
linear inequalities can be used to impose safe-
6 Modifications of the above system can be used in general chance-
constrained applications as well. Interested readers can contact the
authors  for  a  more  detailed  discussion  of general  chance-con-
strained applications.
ty-first upon  solutions.  This is accomplished
while  simultaneously  allowing  the  model  to
select the least constraining linear lower partial
moment which satisfies the stochastic inequal-
ity. While the resulting solutions are often con-
servative,  they  are  usually much  less  conser-
vative  than  when  using  the  linear  mean
income-absolute  deviation  inequality  dis-
cussed by Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker.
In conclusion, the safety-first model has been
theoretically discussed for a number of years.
The linear lower partial moment methods pre-
sented in this paper enable  the researcher  to
impose  probabilistic  constraints  in  a  more
complex  decision  setting  and  with  less  con-
servative  probability  limits  than  was  previ-
ously possible.  As a result, the agricultural re-
searcher  should  be  able  to  investigate  more
thoroughly  and  analyze  the potential  of the
safety-first  model.
[Received April 1987; final revision
received January 1988.]
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implies Q(t)/(t - g) < 1/L* with t > gand Q(t) > 0. Thus,
(4) and  (5) imply Pr(Z < g)  < Q(t)/(t - g) <  1/L*, which
implies Pr(Z <  g) <  1/L*.
A second condition can  exist if Pr(Z  < g)  = 0.  In this
situation,  t can equal g with Q(t = g) = 0 [even if Pr(Z =
g) should  be as high as  1]  and thus satisfy (5).  However,
if (5) is satisfied with  Q(t = g) = 0,  it is obvious that Z
never falls below t or Pr(Z <  t) = 0 and hence Pr(Z < g)
= 0 <  1/L*. Thus, when a population is discrete, enforcing
(5) as a constraint in an  optimization  model is only  suf-
ficient for Pr(Z < g)  < l/L*.
Appendix  2
Chance-Constraints  and the E-A Chebychev
Inequality
Anderson,  Dillon, and  Hardaker (ADH) discuss  the use
of a mean  income-absolute  deviation  version  of Cheby-
chev's inequality to impose probabilistic constraints. The
inequality is
(B.1)
where M is the mean absolute  deviation about Ez and K
is  a positive constant.  If g is  a goal level  for the random
variable, ADH  show that (B. 1) can be used to obtain the
following inequality:
(B.2) Pr(Z < g) < M/[E(Z) - g].
ADH imply that the modeler can guarantee Pr(Z  <  g) <
1/L* by enforcing
(B.3) M/[E(Z) - g]  <  1/L*,
which can be rearranged to give
(B.4) E(Z) - L*M  - g.
[By a process similar to that of appendix  1,  it can be shown
that B.4 actually guarantees  only Pr(Z  < g) <  1/L* and
not Pr(Z  < g).] A system which implements Telser's cri-







maximize  E(Z) = t
subject to:  Ax  < b,
Yx-  lt+ Id>0,
r'd - M- = 0,
t-  L*2M- >  g,
E'x - t = 0,
x,  d,  > O,
Appendix  1
A Discussion of Inequality (5)
To demonstrate  that t - L*Q(t) > g (5) guarantees only
Pr(Z < g) - 1/L* and not Pr(Z < g) <  1/L*, two situations
must  be examined. First,  assume that Pr(Z <  g)  >  0. In
this case,  since  (5) requires t  - g,  Q(t =  g)  >  0  and (5)
can be satisfied only if t > g. Hence, if Pr(Z < g)  > 0, (5)
where M- is the mean absolute deviation below t = E(Z)
and the remaining parameters and variables are as defined
in the text. In (B.5e), the reference  level t must now equal
the mean since the risk parameter used in (B.1)  is M (the
average absolute deviation about the mean). Since M- (or
average  deviations below the mean) is equal to  /2 M and
(B.4) requires the use of M, M- is modified in a manner
similar to the modifications between systems  (7) and (8)
in the text.
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